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REML A. MABUS, 
PETITIONER/APPELLEE, 
v. 
G. BARTON BLACKSTOCK, BUREAU CHIEF, 
DRIVER LICENSE DIVISION, DEPARTMENT 
OF PUBLIC SAFETY, STATE OF UTAH, 
RESPONDENT/APPELLANT. 
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CASE NO. 981668-CA 
NATURE OF THE CASE AND JURISDICTIONAL BASIS 
This case is an appeal from the trial de novo review of an informal adjudicative 
proceeding in which the trial court reinstated Mabus's driver's license, overturning the 
agency's final order. This Court has original appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(a) (1996). 
APPELLATE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Is the requirement in Utah Code Ann. § 44-6-44.10 (1995) that an officer 
send the division a copy of the citation within 5 days a jurisdictional prerequisite to 
suspension or revocation of a driver's license? Interpretation of section 44-6-44.10 is a 
matter of law, and this Court gives no deference to the trial court. Berube v. Fashion 
Centre Ltd, 111 P.2d 1033, 1038 (Utah 1989); State v. Krueger, slip op. at 2, No. 
981035-CA (Utah App. Feb. 25,1999). 
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2. If the division had the responsibility to prove that the officer sent in his 
citation within 5 days, did petitioner waive the issue by not listing it in his petition for 
judicial review under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-15 (1996). Interpretation of this statute is 
also a matter of law. Berube, 111 P.2d at 1038; Krueger, slip op. at 2. 
PRESERVATION 
Respondent's objections were raised during the trial (Tr. Trial, August 12,1998 at 
37-39).1 
RELEVANT PROVISIONS 
Pertinent statutes are quoted as necessary in the text. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Procedural History 
Because of his refusal to take an intoxilyzer test, the Drivers' License Division 
revoked Mabus's license for one year (R. 5). Mabus filed a timely petition for judicial 
review and an evidentiary hearing was held on August 12, 1998 (Id.). The petition 
alleged a plethora of violations in the revocation process, but not that the paperwork was 
filed too late (R. 1-3). At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, during his closing 
argument, Mabus alleged that the division failed to establish what he called a necessary 
element, i.e., that the peace officer who arrested Mabus sent in the DUI report to the 
division within five days (Tr. at 37). Mabus based his claim on Moore v. Schwendiman, 
1
 The trial transcript is not paginated as part of the record. 
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750 P.2d 204 (Utah App. 1988) (Id.). The trial court agreed with Mabus's reading of 
Moore and reinstated his license (Tr. at 38). 
Statement of Facts 
At 1:30 in the morning on January 18, 1998, Officer Paul Cardall, a reserve officer 
with the Bountiful City Police Department saw Mabus, who was driving a maroon 
Corvette, stop at a green light (R. 12). Mabus turned westbound and straddled the middle 
line before going back into the left-hand lane (Id.). Suspecting possible impairment, 
Officer Cardall turned on his overhead lights and Mabus stopped his car (R. 13). 
As soon as the officer began talking with Mabus, he smelled alcohol and saw that 
Mabus's pants were unbuttoned (Id. 13-14). Officer Cardall conducted field sobriety 
tests, including horizontal gaze nystagmus, the one-leg stand, and the walk and turn (Id. at 
14-17). He failed the nystagmus test, the walk-and-turn test, and refused to do the one-
leg stand (Id.). Based on these failures, Officer Cardall arrested Mabus and took him to 
the local station house for an intoxilyzer test (Id. at 17). 
Another Bountiful City Officer, Todd Mia, read Mabus the admonitions for the 
intoxilyzer test (Id. at 33). He gave him four opportunities to take the test, but each time 
Mabus refused, saying "I think I will turn it down" (Id.). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Five-day rule not a jurisdictional prerequisite. The trial court failed to 
recognize that the statutory language containing the five-day rule had changed 
Page 3 of 10 
fundamentally since Moore, even though this Court, in a footnote to that case, recognized 
the change. 
Petitioner's failure to allege error in petition. Petitioner did not allege in his 
petition for judicial review that the officer had failed to send in the report within five 
days; consequently, he waived it. 
ARGUMENT 
L THE 1984 STATUTE THAT WAS THE BASIS FOR 
THE APPELLATE COURT'S MOORE DECISION WAS 
AMENDED IN 1988 AND NO LONGER CONTAINS 
THE PROVISION UPON WHICH PETITIONER 
RELIES; CONSEQUENTLY, RELIANCE UPON 
MOORE IS INCORRECT. 
Contrary to petitioner's representation to the trial court, Moore v. Schwendiman, 
750 P.2d 204 (Utah App.1988), is no longer good law, having been abrogated by new 
statutory provisions enacted in 1988 and still in effect today. The sole footnote in Moore 
specifically states that the analysis in that opinion is confined to the statute in effect in 
1984, when Moore was arrested. Moore, 750 P.2d at 206 n.l. The appellate court, in that 
footnote, then proceeded to explain why the result would be different under the 1988 
amendment. With minor changes in wording and numbering, the substance of the 1988 
amendment was in effect when Officers Mia and Cardall arrested petitioner in 1998. Id. 
The new statute, as explained by the Moore footnote, controls this case. 
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The 1984 version of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10 made submission of the 
officer's sworn report within 5 days "essential to the validity of the subsequent 
proceedings . . . for revocation." Moore, 750 P.2d at 206. Because the division had not 
provided evidence of the date of the submission, the Court of Appeals ruled that the 
revocation was a legal nullity. Since 1988, submission of the officer's report, is no longer 
essential to the validity of the revocation proceeding. It is neither an element that the 
respondent must prove nor a jurisdictional prerequisite, but, as this Court court stated in 
Moore, only a "matter of form." 
We note that our decision today interprets section 41-6-44.10 as 
that statute existed in 1984, the time of appellant's arrest. Since 1984, 
section 41-6-44.10 has been substantially amended. Now, this section reads 
in pertinent part: 
(iii)... The peace officer shall submit a signed report, within 
five days after the date of arrest. 
Under this version of the statute, it is not the five-day requirement 
which begins the administrative revocation process and thus the argument 
that the five-day requirement is mandatory is weaker. Now, the five-day 
requirement is more a matter of form as no substantial rights depend 
on its literal application. The statute places the burden on the driver to 
make a written application for an administrative hearing within ten days 
after the date of the arrest. It is this time requirement that begins the 
administrative hearing process. 
Id. at 206 n.l (emphasis added and citation omitted). 
The statute in effect when the police arrested petitioner, Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-
44.10 (Supp. 1998), parallels the 1988 statute the Moore court discussed in the footnote. 
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Consequently, the five-day submission requirement does not begin the revocation process 
and no "substantial rights depend on its literal application." Moore, 750 P.2d at 206 n.l. 
Under the 1988 statute and the current statute, the revocation process began with the 
issuance and service of the citation. Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10(2)(b) (Supp. 1988).2 
The five-day provision is merely a direction to the officer. It need not be proved in the 
trial de novo. This reading of the current statute simply makes sense. The word "shall" 
signifies a mandate, but not necessarily that a failure to meet its command strips an 
agency or a court of jurisdiction. The Texas courts of appeal have discussed a similar 
provision in their drivers' license code and have found that the direction to the officer is 
merely that, a mandatory direction to the officer, but not one that carries with it 
jurisdictional power. Texas Dep 7 of Public Safety v. Gratzer, 982 S.W.2d 88, 91 (Tex. 
App. 1998); Texas Dep 7 of Public Safety v. Repschleger, 951 S. W.2d 932, 934 (Tex. 
App. 1997). 
Although the word "shall" is generally construed to be 
mandatory, it may be and frequently is held to be merely 
directory. In determining whether the Legislature intended 
[that the word be] mandatory or merely directory, 
consideration should be given to the entire act, its nature and 
object, and the consequences that would follow from each 
construction. Provisions which are not of the essence of the 
2
 "[A] peace officer shall serve on the person, on behalf of the Driver License 
Division, immediate notice of the Driver License Division's intention to revoke the person's 
privilege or license to operate a motor vehicle." The 1984 statute made the submission of the 
sworn report the initiation of the proceeding. In 1988 and now the citation initiates the 
proceeding. Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10(2)(e)(i) (Supp. 1998). 
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thing to be done, but which are included for the purpose of 
promoting the proper, orderly and prompt conduct of 
business, are not generally regarded as mandatory. 
Gratzer, 982 S.W.2d at 91. 
Because Moore does not represent current law, and is, in fact, directly contrary to 
the only appellate court analysis of current law, the trial court's ruling is based on a 
mistake of law and should be reversed. 
II. EVEN IF MOORE IS STILL A VALID 
INTERPRETATION OF THE LAW, THE ISSUE WAS 
NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THE COURT AND WAS 
WAIVED. 
The method of judicial review also has significantly changed since Moore. In 
1988, the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA) came into effect and changed the 
way courts review administrative actions. Under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-15(l)(a), 
district courts have jurisdiction to review by trial de novo informal adjudicative 
proceedings. These trials de novo must be initiated by a petition for judicial review. Id. 
Under UAPA, petitions are actually complaints governed by the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-15(2)(a)( 1996). The petition must include "facts 
demonstrating that the party seeking judicial review is entitled to obtain judicial review" 
and "a statement of the reasons why the petitioner is entitled to relief." Contrary to pre-
UAPA practice in drivers' license matters, a petition for judicial review is not a bare-
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bones request for a de novo hearing. It requires specificity in pleading that was not 
required under Moore. See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10 (1981) (amended 1988).3 
Because it is a complaint governed by civil rules, and because UAPA expressly 
requires specific pleading of facts and reasons entitling a petitioner to relief, a failure to 
plead those matters constitutes waiver. Mabus did not state in his petition that he was 
entitled to relief because the officers missed, or may have missed, the 5-day deadline. 
Pursuant to normal civil rules, that issue is therefore waived and should not have been 
considered. Wright v. University of Utah, 876 P.2d 380, 384-85 (Utah App. 1994); cf 
Utah R.Civ. P. 15(b) (1998) ("When issues not raised by the pleading are tried by express 
or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been 
raised in the pleadings."). Respondent objected to consideration of this matter. Under 
those circumstances, the 5-day issue should have been considered waived by petitioner's 
failure to properly plead it. Cf Worrall v. Ogden City Fire Dep V, 616 P.2d 598, 602 
(Utah 1980). 
3
 Any person whose license has been revoked by the department... 
shall have the right to file a petition within 30 days thereafter for a 
hearing in the matter in the district court Such court is hereby 
vested with jurisdiction, and it shall be its duty to set the matter for 
trial de novo . . . to take testimony and examine into the facts of the 
case and to determine whether the petitioner's license is subject to 
revocation under the provisions of this act. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10(b) (1981) (amended 1988). This pre-UAPA appeal provision did 
not require any specificity in pleading. UAPA, on the other hand, requires it. 
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<: - LUSION 
The trial court's order reinstating Mabus' license should be reversed and the matter 
remanded for it to enter an order based on the evidence adduced at the trial regarding 
Mabus's refusal to take the intoxilyzer test. 
REQIU'SI in' €»il ' I111 in mi ISHED OPINION 
Because there have been no cases on this issue since Moore in 1989 and the DUI 
statute has changed, the division requests a published opinion. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED^ March 1999. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Utah Attorney Genera 
James H. Beadles 
Assistant Attorney General 
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uuEKT>lJM 
D. SCOTT LITTLE #4617 
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER 
140 WEST 9000 SOUTH, SUIT 
SANDY, UTAH 84070-2006 
(801) 562-1459 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT if1 \ND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
REML A. MABUSf 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
G. BARTON BLACKSTOCK, 
Bureau Chief 
Driver License Division, 
Department of Public Safety, 
State of Utah, 
Respondent. 
: 
ORDER VACATING 
ADMINISTRATIVE REVOCATION 
OF PETITIONER'S 
DRIVING PRIVILEGES 
CASE NO. 980902896 
: HONORABLE STEPHEN L. HENRIOD 
: 
THE ABOVE ENTITLED MATTER came before the Court on the 12th 
day of August 1998 before the Honorable Steven Henroid * Trial De 
N O V O ' ' i M ' M 1 I ' M I ' H h i i i Hi ni l l l i I ii i - i t ta w l i l t T 
revoking Petitioner's driving privileges. The Petitioner was 
present and represented by counsel, Scott Little. Respondent 
was represented y l n ^ t i i l "I'MI I n v t 1,-iiiiit's 
H. Beadles, Assistant Attorney General. The Department called one 
witness for the presentation of its case. Testimony was presented 
j 
Department rested, 
Officer Todd 
being fu ] ] y 
conclusions c; ,-^ 
I I i » 
Petitioner testified and Bountiful City 
sailed ^ brief rebuttal. The Court 
le :i ts • fj i I ::i I ngs • :: f fa :: I:, 
=iad oxuei as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Petitioner is a resident of Salt Lake County; 
2. No evidence was presented that the peace officer submitted 
a signed report as required by Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-
44.10(2)(d). 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
3. This Court has jurisdiction to hear this case and venue is 
proper pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-44.10(2)(i)(ii) and 
§ 63-46b-15(l). 
4. The failure of the peace officer to submit a signed report 
as required by Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-44.10(2)(d) is fatal to 
the revocation process. 
ORDER 
BASED UPON THE FOREGOING THE Order of the Department of Public 
Safety, Driver License Division revoking Petitioner's driving 
privileges is vacated and the Driver License Division is ordered to 
return Petitioner's driver license to him and show his driver 
license to be valid in its records. 
DATED this [l day of Au^st, 1998. 
2 
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